While Rome was held pointless as the long-awaited rite of confidence in the Government, Brussels boasted one battle that will be crucial to our economy and the European Union: rewriting of the Stability and Growth Pact.
And the fact that the Premier in his dual relationship, the House and Senate, they have not been mentioned as the opposition have not used as an excuse to exercise their critical function, speaks volumes about the level of the political class we have. Fortunately, at least one of the theme has been busy and there is concern, I refer to Minister Tremonti, who was responsible for the line selected by Italy in this forum: along with France and Belgium - and into northern Europe, from Germany on - against the hypothesis that it adopts a regulation under which the Community against countries that fail to meet commitments to reduce current account deficit and especially the stock of debt and taking heavy automatic sanctions, and for the fact that the assessment on budgetary policies adopted by various governments to enter other elements and parameters, starting with private indebtedness (which in the case of Italy compensates significantly the public sector).
What was the real outcome of this hard tug of war we will see when you rewrite the treaties and especially when they are put into effect, as is however a compromise has now allowed all shouting victory. There is no doubt, however, that two things are clear. The first is that, after the crisis in Greece and the fears that have been rekindled in recent days about Ireland and Portugal, with their spreads over German bunds soared to historic highs, the focus of attention has shifted from deficit to debt.
A choice of priorities that change the internal relations within the Eurogroup and the Commission. With the Germans who want to - Are enough words full of triumphalism used by Merkel to comment the outcome of the confrontation - use the absolute firmness in requiring a repayment plans and applying penalties for those who do not respect them. Then again, you will only see the way those plans and what will be compulsory as automatic and heavy penalties, but there is no doubt that for an indebted country like ours, with a debt ratio to 118.5% for next year to increase by one percentage point will change not just the policy of public finance.
The second certainty emerged from the decisions taken in Brussels aimed at rewriting the pact is that Europe has once again focused on "stability" to the detriment of "growth." With consequences, this time for everyone, not just for Italy, very serious. Indeed, the more serious because we wanted to strengthen the supervisory regime of public accounts. Because the conjunction between restrictive budgetary policies and lack of development policies, could block the modest recovery already underway and reprecipitated to the Old World into recession.
short, the historical task they had - but let's say that, because we must not despair - European governments was (is) to rewrite and do not touch the pact, making it not only less stupid (and se gli automatismi aumentano, non lo si rende certo più intelligente) ma anche e soprattutto più articolato. Sì, certo, deficit e debito. Ma anche le politiche fiscali, quelli di welfare, quelle industriali. Per esempio, visto che un po’ tutti i paesi sono alle prese con riforme pensionistiche che hanno al centro la necessità di alzare l’età pensionabile, perché non stabilire una comune regolamentazione, fissando tempi di adeguamento e relative forme di incentivi-disincentivi? Tra l’altro, i paesi che hanno il debito alto – e peraltro se il parametro massimo rimane il 60%, praticamente un po’ tutti – se vogliono rientrare trovano proprio nella spesa pensionistica il primo rubinetto che devono stringere.
E questa regolamentazione comunitaria li favorirebbe, non fosse altro per meglio far digerire alle rispettive opinioni pubbliche misure considerate (a torto) impopolari. E come questa, tante altre possono essere le scelte da vincolare.
Così, come, al contrario sono molte le voci di investimento che possono aiutare la crescita che dovrebbero essere attivate in modo coordinato o addirittura comune. A questo fine, la proposta di eurobond per le grandi infrastrutture materiali e immateriali avanzata da Tremonti è un esempio di come si possa e si debba rivedere l’intero impianto della politica economica di Eurolandia. Ecco, è su questo e non altro che dovrebbe essere concentrata la nostra attenzione. E non sono argomenti da campagna elettorale. Mentre a Roma si svolgeva il tanto atteso quanto inutile rito della fiducia al Governo, a Bruxelles si consumava una battaglia che risulterà decisiva per la nostra economia e per quella europea: la riscrittura del Patto di Stabilità e Crescita. E il fatto che il premier nella sua doppia relazione, Camera e Senato, non ne abbia fatto cenno così come le opposizioni non l’abbiano usato come argomento per esercitare la loro funzione critica, la dice lunga sul livello della classe politica di cui disponiamo. Per fortuna almeno uno che del tema si sia occupato e preoccupato c’è, mi riferisco al ministro Tremonti, cui si deve la linea scelta dall’Italia in quel consesso: insieme a Francia e Belgio – and into northern Europe, from Germany up - against the hypothesis that we adopt a Community regulation whereby against countries that fail to meet commitments to reduce current account deficit and especially the stock of debt and taking heavy automatic sanctions , and for the fact that in evaluating the fiscal policies adopted by various governments to enter other elements and parameters, starting with private indebtedness (which in the case of Italy significantly offset the public sector).
What was the real outcome of this hard tug of war we will see when you rewrite the treaties and especially when they are implemented in practice, since as we too a compromise has now allowed all shouting victory. There is no doubt, however, that two things are clear. The first is that, after the crisis in Greece and the fears that have been rekindled in recent days about Ireland and Portugal, with their spreads over German bunds soared to historic highs, the focus of attention has shifted from deficit to debt. A choice of priorities that change the internal relations within the Eurogroup and the Commission.
With the Germans they want - full of triumphalism are enough words used by Merkel to comment the outcome of the confrontation - use the absolute firmness in requiring a repayment plans and applying sanctions for those not respects.
Then, again, you will only see the way those plans and what will be compulsory as automatic and heavy penalties, but there is no doubt that debt for a country like ours, with a debt ratio to 118.5 % for next year to increase by one percentage point will change not just the policy of public finance.
The second certainty emerged from the decisions taken in Brussels aimed at rewriting the pact is that Europe has once again focused on "stability" to the detriment of "growth." With consequences, this time for everyone, not just for Italy, very serious.
Indeed, the more serious because they wanted to strengthen the supervisory regime of public accounts. Why
conjunction between restrictive budgetary policies and lack of development policies, could block the modest recovery already underway and reprecipitated to the Old World into recession.
short, the historical task they had - but let's say that, because we must not despair - European governments was (is) to rewrite and do not touch the pact, making it not only less stupid (and if the automatic increase, not it certainly makes it more intelligent) but also more complex. Yes, of course, deficit and debt. But tax policies, those of welfare, those industriali.
Per esempio, visto che un po’ tutti i paesi sono alle prese con riforme pensionistiche che hanno al centro la necessità di alzare l’età pensionabile, perché non stabilire una comune regolamentazione, fissando tempi di adeguamento e relative forme di incentivi-disincentivi?
Tra l’altro, i paesi che hanno il debito alto – e peraltro se il parametro massimo rimane il 60%, praticamente un po’ tutti – se vogliono rientrare trovano proprio nella spesa pensionistica il primo rubinetto che devono stringere. E questa regolamentazione comunitaria li favorirebbe, non fosse altro per meglio far digerire alle rispettive opinioni pubbliche misure considerate (a torto) impopolari. E come questa, many others may be choices to be placed. So, like, on the contrary there are many items that can help investment growth, which should be activated in a coordinated way, or even common.
To this end, the proposal for eurobond for large and soft infrastructure made by Tremonti is an example of what can and should review the entire system of economic policy in Euroland. Here, it is on this and nothing else that should be concentrated our attention. And there are arguments to the election campaign.
Henry Cisnetto
And the fact that the Premier in his dual relationship, the House and Senate, they have not been mentioned as the opposition have not used as an excuse to exercise their critical function, speaks volumes about the level of the political class we have. Fortunately, at least one of the theme has been busy and there is concern, I refer to Minister Tremonti, who was responsible for the line selected by Italy in this forum: along with France and Belgium - and into northern Europe, from Germany on - against the hypothesis that it adopts a regulation under which the Community against countries that fail to meet commitments to reduce current account deficit and especially the stock of debt and taking heavy automatic sanctions, and for the fact that the assessment on budgetary policies adopted by various governments to enter other elements and parameters, starting with private indebtedness (which in the case of Italy compensates significantly the public sector).
What was the real outcome of this hard tug of war we will see when you rewrite the treaties and especially when they are put into effect, as is however a compromise has now allowed all shouting victory. There is no doubt, however, that two things are clear. The first is that, after the crisis in Greece and the fears that have been rekindled in recent days about Ireland and Portugal, with their spreads over German bunds soared to historic highs, the focus of attention has shifted from deficit to debt.
A choice of priorities that change the internal relations within the Eurogroup and the Commission. With the Germans who want to - Are enough words full of triumphalism used by Merkel to comment the outcome of the confrontation - use the absolute firmness in requiring a repayment plans and applying penalties for those who do not respect them. Then again, you will only see the way those plans and what will be compulsory as automatic and heavy penalties, but there is no doubt that for an indebted country like ours, with a debt ratio to 118.5% for next year to increase by one percentage point will change not just the policy of public finance.
The second certainty emerged from the decisions taken in Brussels aimed at rewriting the pact is that Europe has once again focused on "stability" to the detriment of "growth." With consequences, this time for everyone, not just for Italy, very serious. Indeed, the more serious because we wanted to strengthen the supervisory regime of public accounts. Because the conjunction between restrictive budgetary policies and lack of development policies, could block the modest recovery already underway and reprecipitated to the Old World into recession.
short, the historical task they had - but let's say that, because we must not despair - European governments was (is) to rewrite and do not touch the pact, making it not only less stupid (and se gli automatismi aumentano, non lo si rende certo più intelligente) ma anche e soprattutto più articolato. Sì, certo, deficit e debito. Ma anche le politiche fiscali, quelli di welfare, quelle industriali. Per esempio, visto che un po’ tutti i paesi sono alle prese con riforme pensionistiche che hanno al centro la necessità di alzare l’età pensionabile, perché non stabilire una comune regolamentazione, fissando tempi di adeguamento e relative forme di incentivi-disincentivi? Tra l’altro, i paesi che hanno il debito alto – e peraltro se il parametro massimo rimane il 60%, praticamente un po’ tutti – se vogliono rientrare trovano proprio nella spesa pensionistica il primo rubinetto che devono stringere.
E questa regolamentazione comunitaria li favorirebbe, non fosse altro per meglio far digerire alle rispettive opinioni pubbliche misure considerate (a torto) impopolari. E come questa, tante altre possono essere le scelte da vincolare.
Così, come, al contrario sono molte le voci di investimento che possono aiutare la crescita che dovrebbero essere attivate in modo coordinato o addirittura comune. A questo fine, la proposta di eurobond per le grandi infrastrutture materiali e immateriali avanzata da Tremonti è un esempio di come si possa e si debba rivedere l’intero impianto della politica economica di Eurolandia. Ecco, è su questo e non altro che dovrebbe essere concentrata la nostra attenzione. E non sono argomenti da campagna elettorale. Mentre a Roma si svolgeva il tanto atteso quanto inutile rito della fiducia al Governo, a Bruxelles si consumava una battaglia che risulterà decisiva per la nostra economia e per quella europea: la riscrittura del Patto di Stabilità e Crescita. E il fatto che il premier nella sua doppia relazione, Camera e Senato, non ne abbia fatto cenno così come le opposizioni non l’abbiano usato come argomento per esercitare la loro funzione critica, la dice lunga sul livello della classe politica di cui disponiamo. Per fortuna almeno uno che del tema si sia occupato e preoccupato c’è, mi riferisco al ministro Tremonti, cui si deve la linea scelta dall’Italia in quel consesso: insieme a Francia e Belgio – and into northern Europe, from Germany up - against the hypothesis that we adopt a Community regulation whereby against countries that fail to meet commitments to reduce current account deficit and especially the stock of debt and taking heavy automatic sanctions , and for the fact that in evaluating the fiscal policies adopted by various governments to enter other elements and parameters, starting with private indebtedness (which in the case of Italy significantly offset the public sector).
What was the real outcome of this hard tug of war we will see when you rewrite the treaties and especially when they are implemented in practice, since as we too a compromise has now allowed all shouting victory. There is no doubt, however, that two things are clear. The first is that, after the crisis in Greece and the fears that have been rekindled in recent days about Ireland and Portugal, with their spreads over German bunds soared to historic highs, the focus of attention has shifted from deficit to debt. A choice of priorities that change the internal relations within the Eurogroup and the Commission.
With the Germans they want - full of triumphalism are enough words used by Merkel to comment the outcome of the confrontation - use the absolute firmness in requiring a repayment plans and applying sanctions for those not respects.
Then, again, you will only see the way those plans and what will be compulsory as automatic and heavy penalties, but there is no doubt that debt for a country like ours, with a debt ratio to 118.5 % for next year to increase by one percentage point will change not just the policy of public finance.
The second certainty emerged from the decisions taken in Brussels aimed at rewriting the pact is that Europe has once again focused on "stability" to the detriment of "growth." With consequences, this time for everyone, not just for Italy, very serious.
Indeed, the more serious because they wanted to strengthen the supervisory regime of public accounts. Why
conjunction between restrictive budgetary policies and lack of development policies, could block the modest recovery already underway and reprecipitated to the Old World into recession.
short, the historical task they had - but let's say that, because we must not despair - European governments was (is) to rewrite and do not touch the pact, making it not only less stupid (and if the automatic increase, not it certainly makes it more intelligent) but also more complex. Yes, of course, deficit and debt. But tax policies, those of welfare, those industriali.
Per esempio, visto che un po’ tutti i paesi sono alle prese con riforme pensionistiche che hanno al centro la necessità di alzare l’età pensionabile, perché non stabilire una comune regolamentazione, fissando tempi di adeguamento e relative forme di incentivi-disincentivi?
Tra l’altro, i paesi che hanno il debito alto – e peraltro se il parametro massimo rimane il 60%, praticamente un po’ tutti – se vogliono rientrare trovano proprio nella spesa pensionistica il primo rubinetto che devono stringere. E questa regolamentazione comunitaria li favorirebbe, non fosse altro per meglio far digerire alle rispettive opinioni pubbliche misure considerate (a torto) impopolari. E come questa, many others may be choices to be placed. So, like, on the contrary there are many items that can help investment growth, which should be activated in a coordinated way, or even common.
To this end, the proposal for eurobond for large and soft infrastructure made by Tremonti is an example of what can and should review the entire system of economic policy in Euroland. Here, it is on this and nothing else that should be concentrated our attention. And there are arguments to the election campaign.
Henry Cisnetto
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